Saturday, 10. May 2003
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
I did some very interesting observations today. The District Government of Düsseldorf ordered providers statewide to block stormfront.org - preferably by faking their DNS entries. To assess the degree to which filtering is applied I hacked a massive I/O multiplexing DNS-scanner (named 'crashdive') - and to my great astonishment first results indicate that in the domain of our state (nrw.de) 100% of the DNS servers accessible to me do not block stormfront.org. Try:
$ dig stormfront.org @nic.netzagentur.nrw.de $ dig stormfront.org @ns.lds.nrw.de $ dig stormfront.org @ns1.lds.nrw.de $ dig stormfront.org @ns2.lds.nrw.de
and compare this to a provider where blocking is done:
$ dig stormfront.org @ns2.netcologne.de
disLEXia, a research project by Maximillian Dornseif
 |  |  | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
   |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |  |  | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||