Friday, 22. November 1996
Danish government puts its own records on the Web, illegally
Many of the requests processed by local government offices are requests for
information from government records. This fact has given the Danish
Ministry of Research a seemingly brilliant idea: Making government records
available on the World Wide Web would free local government officials from
processing these requests.
The first government records were made public on October 1 on
<http://ditdanmark.nethotel.dk/vurdering/>. The information was taken from
the land and building property evaluation records of the Danish Tax
Ministry. These records are used by employees in the tax offices of the
local government for taxation of land and building property. The published
information included the following for each piece of land and building
property in Denmark: Location, owner, estimated value, date and price
(including down payment) of last sale (if sold since last evaluation of the
property in 1992), debts to local government, rental value for
non-residential property (if rented) and further notes intended to assist
evaluation.
On the October 15 the records were made inaccessible when the large,
reputable Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende published a critique by
professor Erik Frøkjær from the Department of Computer Science at
Copenhagen University. Two thing were criticized:
1. The records could be copied without explicit permit by anyone with
access to the Internet, something which is not allowed according to the
Danish Public Authorities' Registers Act.
2. The last three items in the list above were confidential information and
could not legally be published under Danish law.
Access to the records was reestablished the next day when the offending
items had been removed. At that time the publisher, Kommunedata, assured
the public and the Danish Data Surveillance Authority ("Registertilsynet")
that the records could not be copied. The company also publicly explained
that Erik Frøkjær could not possibly have copied the records except by
means that were not entirely legal.
Soon after this a group of researchers contacted the Danish Data
Surveillance Authority to demonstrate that the records are easily copied
(with entirely legal means), but the offer of a demonstration has been
declined by the Authority. Copies of the case obtained from the Authority
under the Danish Freedom of Information Act show that the Authority has been
made aware by other means that copying is possible. Despite this the
Authority refuses to take action based on this evidence so WWW access is
still possible. The only change since the reopening has been removal of most
of the information about sales when the Court in Århus informed the
Authority that this information is not and should not be publicly available.
This is the first case known to me of government records being published on
the World Wide Web. The case is instructive: There has been repeated valid
objections to the legal basis on which the records are made available. This
and the fact that the continuing operation of this service is not important
for anything but the reputation of the parties involved, leads me to expect
that access ought to be at least temporarily suspended until the questions
were resolved.
This case demonstrates a large collection of security problems inherent to
World Wide Web publication of government records as well as a lot of legal
problems that will not be mentioned here. These problems are probably
compounded because both the Danish government and Kommunedata wants to be
perceived as technologically advanced and "Internet-friendly".
1) The original records were used by the employees in local tax offices, so
information that was not meant to be disclosed publicly was maintained
together with the evaluation of each piece of property. When the records
were made available on the World Wide Web without cleanup, confidential
information was disclosed. Moral: When sensitive information is put to use
in a new way it should be checked to make sure that all information is
appropriate for the new use.
2) The Danish Data Surveillance Authority does not have its own technical
staff, so it wasn't able to asses the correctness of the claim made by the
publisher, Kommunedata, that the records could not be copied. Moral:
Government authorities should not rely on experts employed by the companies
that are checked. When new types of problems are encountered the government
should use their own or independent security experts to assess the claims
made by companies.
3) It is not possible to prevent information published on the Internet from
being copied, so information that must not be copied should not be available
on the Internet.
4) Until now the companies and government authorities involved has ignored
criticism from computer professionals. Moral: Government officials does not
automatically listen when professionals criticize security. If the critique
goes against official policy you might very well be ignored or worse, no
matter how serious the problem is.
5) Denmark prides itself on its large information systems in the public
administration. These information systems have been accepted by the public
because of a set of very restrictive laws governing these records and strict
attention to security. Other governments may be tempted to publish similar
records on the World Wide Web because when the security-conscious Danes do
it, it must be OK.
6) To add insult to injury the programs used by Kommunedata to control
access to the records performs no parameter validation which shows that
this publication probably has yet more security problems in store.
Despite the problems with publication of the records the Ministry of
Research and Kommunedata wants to make even more sensitive and personal data
available on the World Wide Web in the future. I shudder as I contemplate
the consequences.
Ketil Perstrup (ketil@diku.dk) [ketil@diku.dk (Ketil Perstrup) via risks-digest Volume 18, Issue 63]
14:28 |
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Risks of believing what you read: Re: Irish rock band (RISKS-18.62)
... first group to be burglarized on the Internet [?]
Those who are following this story will already know that the samples from
U2's new album were not ""siphoned off" along cables feeding the band's own
video camera", that provides a one day delayed view of U2's studio
activities, but were copied from a promotional video that was sent out from
Island Records to their office in Hungary. The video was reported to have
been borrowed and samples taken from it - a purposely degraded recording -
were uploaded to a web page on the Internet.
The story seems to have got very quickly elaborated to include hackers. The
hacker aspect appears to have come from the quote in the Sunday Times from a
"former hacker":
Hackers may have used the camera as a door into the studio's computers
where the new songs are stored.
The real risk here is that it seems that newspapers don't employ anyone
qualified to proofread and follow up their Internet related stories. (Also
c.f. the recent Observer story about pornography on the Internet). [stuart@gol.com (Stuart Woodward) via risks-digest Volume 18, Issue 63]
17:13 |
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Massive NY tax fraud
Hacker Scheme, By KAREN MATTHEWS, Associated Press Writer
NEW YORK (AP) -- City workers, in exchange for bribes from property
owners, falsified computer records to eliminate nearly $13 million in
unpaid taxes in a scheme called the largest tax fraud case in New York
City history. [Associated Press news wire via CompuServe's Executive News
Service, AP US & World, 22 Nov 1996]
The author makes the following key points:
o Some tax records erased.
o Other records falsely indicated as paid using funds from legitimate
payments by innocent victims.
o So far, 29 people charged in federal court.
o 200 more expected to be charged.
o $13M of debts erased.
o $7M in interest lost.
o Fraud thought to have started in 1992.
o Investigation started in 1994.
o In a section particularly intriguing for RISKS and NCSA FORUM participants,
the author writes, ``Three employees of the city collector's offices
exploited computer "glitches" to make it appear that unpaid taxes had
been paid, officials said.
More, no doubt, as the case unfolds.
M. E. Kabay, Ph.D. (Kirkland, QC), Director of Education
National Computer Security Association (http://www.ncsa.com) [Mich Kabay <75300.3232@CompuServe.COM> via risks-digest Volume 18, Issue 63]
17:36 |
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disLEXia, a research project by Maximillian Dornseif
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